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Abstract
The causes of socioeconomic inequality have been debated since the time of Plato. Many reasons for the development of
stratification have been proposed, from the need for hierarchical control over large-scale irrigation systems to the
accumulation of small differences in wealth over time via inheritance processes. However, none of these explains how
unequal societies came to completely displace egalitarian cultural norms over time. Our study models demographic
consequences associated with the unequal distribution of resources in stratified societies. Agent-based simulation results
show that in constant environments, unequal access to resources can be demographically destabilizing, resulting in the
outward migration and spread of such societies even when population size is relatively small. In variable environments,
stratified societies spread more and are also better able to survive resource shortages by sequestering mortality in the lower
classes. The predictions of our simulation are provided modest support by a range of existing empirical studies. In short, the
fact that stratified societies today vastly outnumber egalitarian societies may not be due to the transformation of egalitarian
norms and structures, but may instead reflect the more rapid migration of stratified societies and consequent conquest or
displacement of egalitarian societies over time.
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Introduction
Inequalities in socioeconomic status are increasing sharply
within and between societies [1–3]. But human societies have not
always been stratified. In this study we propose and test a
demographic mechanism that may explain how stratified societies
spread and became the dominant form of societal organization.
It has been suggested that early foraging societies rigorously
enforced social and economic ‘‘leveling mechanisms’’ to prevent
any individual or group from acquiring more status, authority, or
resources than others [4–10]. In fact, one of the central adaptations
during the course of human evolution may have been the
suppression of older dominance instincts through the enforcement
of these egalitarian cultural norms [6]. Whether or not this was the
case, it is generally accepted that early societies were less complex
and more equal than societies arising over the past 10,000 years [7].
How did stratified societies—those with institutionalized
inequality—spread and become the dominant form of societal
organization during the Neolithic period? Mid-twentieth-century
explanations assumed that population growth led to the need for
agriculture, which generated surplus and required managers and
other specialized roles, leading naturally to various classes [11–13].
When resource depletion necessitated further expansion, conflict
and conquest resulted in even greater hierarchy. More recent
explanations of socioeconomic stratification are generally individ-
ualistic (natural tendencies toward selfishness and dominance
impart individual selective advantage) [14–16], group adaptive
(socioeconomic stratification promotes cooperation or confers
economic and organizational efficiencies that enable societies to
cope with new technologies, larger populations, competition and
conflict) [17–23], or mechanistic (patchy landscapes, private
property and inheritance mechanisms lead to the accumulation
of small differences in wealth over time) [24–26].
While each of these explanations contributes insights on why the
shift towards stratification may have taken place, or on
mechanisms by which inequality was self-perpetuating, none
develops the dynamics of the process by which unequal societies
displaced more egalitarian societies. Why did early pastoralists and
agriculturalists relinquish a communal approach to property and
cease to enforce the leveling mechanisms that had previously
prevented individual differences and stochastic economic shocks
from resulting in permanent inequalities? Empirical data on
cultural transmission indicate that norms, values, social structures
and other foundational features of culture tend to be transmitted
conservatively and vertically within groups [27–31]. Such
communally-held traits are not likely to be altered by individual
choices or by transmission from group to group. However, they
may instead spread through demic diffusion; i.e. population growth
or migration of the groups carrying the culture. Demographic
studies have linked fertility and mortality with access to food
resources [32,33]. Because egalitarian and stratified societies
allocate resources—including food—differently, the two cultural
strategies could have strong implications for the demography and
thus the expansion of populations bearing the two cultural types.
We hypothesize, therefore, that the spread of socioeconomic
stratification may have been a result of cultural change via demic
diffusion. In other words, socioeconomic stratification may have
spread across the globe over the past several thousand years, not
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egalitarian cultures, but simply because it altered demographic
outcomes in ways that produced an increase in frequency of stratified
populations, through population expansion or the outward migration
of populations in search of additional territory and resources.
To explore this hypothesis, we developed an explicit quantitative
demographic model of the process, ran various agent-based
simulation trials, developed predictions based on model results,
and tested some of these using available data. As with population
genetic models of the spread of random mutations, our model is not
intended to show how inequality developed between individuals,
but to explore a basic demographic mechanism that may have
caused the spread of such societies once stratification emerged. Our
ultimate objective is to determine whether demic diffusion could
have produced the global shift from egalitarian to stratified societies
over time, and, where possible, to test the predictions of this model
against real world data.
Results
Our simulation trials showed that stratified populations in
constant environments exhibited more demographic instability,
crises and extinctions than did egalitarian populations. Figure 1
shows typical population trajectories for egalitarian and stratified
societies over 2000 years. Egalitarian populations are eventually
able to stabilize, not because of density-dependent growth but
because fertility, mortality, and resource productivity achieve a
balance. This is an unexpected outcome in a complex system.
Reaching this balance appears to depend on the stochastically
determined magnitude of the rebound following a population crash.
Stratified populations were never able to stabilize because the
upper classes continued to thrive even as resources were being
depleted and thepopulationwas headedfor trouble. In otherwords,
stratification disrupted stabilizing feedback in the system. However,
stratified populations did not cause more resource depletion, as we
Figure 1. Typical egalitarian and stratified populations in constant environment with baseline parameter values. Egalitarian
populations (A) are able to stabilize, although no logistic or density-dependent growth function was used, while stratified populations (B, C, D)
cannot stabilize because upper classes continue to thrive even as resources are being depleted.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024683.g001
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by upper classes. Instead, stratified populations in our simulation
depleted the resource base significantly less because high mortality
rates in lower classes kept the total population relatively low
compared to carrying capacity.
Analysis of variance and multiple comparisons tests based on
100 trials for each type of society show that the amount of time
spent in a state of population stability was significantly greater for
egalitarian societies. Stability was defined as a time period of 100
or more years during which population size varied by less than
65% on either side of the mean. Multiple comparisons tests
showed that there were significantly fewer demographic crises or
‘‘population crashes’’ (an event in which the population loses at
least 25% of its size in one year or successive years of population
decline) for egalitarian groups than for stratified groups. There
were also significantly fewer extinctions for egalitarian groups,
based on the non-parametric rank order Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Test. Each trial run had a different outcome due to stochasticity of
the demographic and ecological processes in the simulation.
After establishing these baseline parameters and results, we
conducted an analysis of the sensitivity of the results to the
parameter values we used. The parameter values and results for
each sensitivity test are shown in Supporting Information S1.
Within a reasonable range of parameter values, results were
robust. Egalitarian populations were always more stable at every
parameter value except in trials when current resource amount
determines half or more of the next year’s productivity (see
Supporting Information S1). This appears to lead to a very
unstable environment: once depletion begins, it exerts a positive
feedback effect and causes a rapid crash of egalitarian populations.
Egalitarian populations always have fewer population crashes
except in trials with a base female fertility rate of 0.135 (see
Supporting Information S1). This anomalous spot in parameter
space seems to be just high enough to cause population growth
and thus resource depletion, but too low to allow sufficient
recovery.
Egalitarian populations are almost always much less likely to go
extinct, except in trials when resource amount determines half or
more of the next year’s productivity (discussed above), and in trials
with a base annual female fertility rate of .0.18 (see Supporting
Information S1), which apparently causes egalitarian populations
to grow too large, thus depleting resources and resulting in rapid
mortality.
We next altered the simulation to investigate how variable
environments (in which productivity varies from year to year) and
the storage of surplus resources (to be used during times of
shortage) would affect outcomes (see Figure 2). In general,
stratified groups have a lower mean population size than
egalitarians, both because the upper classes reduce the carrying
capacity by taking extra resources, and because lower classes suffer
high levels of mortality. Resource storage appears to raise the
population size slightly for stratified groups but not for egalitarians.
In constant environments, egalitarians have no extinctions without
storage, but storage causes them to overshoot carrying capacity by
a greater amount, leading to extinctions. In variable environments,
egalitarians have very unstable populations and go extinct rapidly;
storage does not afford them protection. Stratification appears to
protect populations against environmental variation because
mortality in bad years is sequestered in the lower classes, allowing
upper classes to survive, while in egalitarian societies the entire
population is at risk. Storage confers some additional protection to
stratified societies in variable environments.
Finally, we ran a series of migration trials to see which society
type—egalitarian or stratified—filled previously unoccupied sites
most rapidly. For each migration event, 65 individuals (or half the
population, if fewer than 130) moved to an unoccupied site; no
conflict occurred. Migration events were triggered when a group
exceeded some threshold value for group mortality, for individual
resource deprivation, or for resource depletion. Figure 3 shows
that although stratified groups have smaller mean populations and
are more likely to go extinct in constant environments, they
migrate more often and thus fill unoccupied sites more rapidly—
for all three triggers—in both constant and variable environments,
as long as open sites are still available (‘‘frontier phase’’). The
simulation did not allow migration into or conflict with already-
occupied sites, although sites at which an existing population had
gone extinct could be reoccupied. Thus, once all sites were
occupied (‘‘carrying capacity phase’’), the original trial dynamics of
stability and extinctions determined how many sites were held or
lost by egalitarian and stratified populations. In the real world, of
course, conflict and conquest allowed stratified groups to continue
their expansion even after all sites were occupied.
Discussion
Our simulation results support the hypothesis that socioeco-
nomic stratification may have spread due to its effects on the
demography of small groups—i.e. by demic diffusion—rather than
cultural adoption. While demic diffusion has already been
indicated as a mechanism for the displacement of hunter-gatherers
by more rapidly-growing agricultural populations [34–36], we do
not specify differences in mode of subsistence, and the demic
diffusion shown in our model is based not on population expansion
but rather on migration due to population instability. If demic
diffusion were simply a function of population growth, then in
constant environments egalitarians would take over sites available
for colonization much more rapidly. In our demographic
simulation, however, three different plausible migration triggers
all lead stratified groups to take over unoccupied sites faster.
In constant environments, inequalities in resource allocation
appear to disrupt the feedback between population growth and
resource depletion, preventing stratified groups from achieving an
equilibrium size and driving them to migrate more despite their
smaller populations. In variable environments, stratified groups
migrate more and are less likely to go extinct than egalitarian
groups. While rapid migration and protection against extinction in
variable environments may be viewed as an adaptive advantage of
stratification, it is more probably a result of individual selection, as
certain individuals survive at the expense of resource deprivation
and mortality for others.
A recent paper linking political egalitarianism with the extreme
variability of the Last Glacial environment argues that scarce and
unpredictable resources enforced behavioral constraints such as small
band size, mobility, and nonacquisitiveness, thus blocking establish-
ment of wealth hierarchies until the climate stabilized during the
Holocene [4]. Our simulation results do not contradict this
proposal—because we do not include these constraints—but may
indicate that once the severe constraints of the Last Glacial were
relaxed during the Holocene, the demographic consequences of
stratificationwereabletocontributetoitsspread.Inamoremoderate
environment, cultural and behavioral responses to resource shortage
can include increased labor or productivity, resource intensification,
shortened reproductive age span, fertility reduction, infanticide and
others. Once all habitable sites are occupied in a region, conflict can
come into play as resource-deprived groups attempt to acquire more
territory. Migration-driven conflict is likelyto have been an important
behavioral response by which stratified societies came to dominate
the landscape during the Holocene.
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model that incorporates feedbacks between food supply, human
fertility and mortality rates, and labor availability in early
Polynesian agricultural populations [37–39]. They found that
fertilitycontroldecreasespopulationgrowthbutincreasesindividual
well-being, while increased labor productivity increases the
equilibrium population size but does not improve individual well-
being. The presence of an upper class to which tribute was paid had
the effect of reducing the equilibrium population size, much as
stratification resulted in smaller populations in our simulation.
Figure 2. Egalitarian and stratified populations in constant and variable environments, with and without storage of surplus. Black
bars show results without storage and white bars with storage. Egalitarians have larger, more stable populations in constant environments (A, C),
while storage causes them to overshoot carrying capacity by a greater extent and go extinct (E). In variable environments, egalitarian populations are
unstable and go extinct (B, D, F). Stratified groups have smaller, less stable populations in constant environments (A, C), and are more likely to go
extinct (E). In variable environments, stratified populations are protected against extinctions because mortality is sequestered in the lower classes;
storage of surplus gives further protection (B, D, F).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024683.g002
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important keys to game theoretic models on the evolution of
cooperation [23]. Perc and Szolnoki investigated the impact of
social diversity (inequality based on a uniform, exponential, or
power law distribution of benefits) on a spatial network-based
Prisoner’s Dilemma game [22]. Counterintuitively, inequality (the
presence of high-ranking cooperative individuals) promoted the
evolution of cooperation by providing successful nodes around
which other cooperators could cluster. Similarly, Santos et al.
found that for graph-based evolutionary Public Goods Games,
heterogeneity in the number, size and cost of games in which
individuals participated promoted the evolution of cooperation by
providing a strong advantage to cooperators at the hubs of
relatively large groups of interacting individuals [17]. Assuming
that cooperation is advantageous for groups, this suggests another
potential evolutionary mechanism for the development of stratified
societies.
Potential Objections
One potential objection to our results is that stratified
populations in Neolithic and later times were much larger than
those of egalitarian foragers from pre-Neolithic times. However,
this can be accounted for by the increased carrying capacity
brought about by the change from foraging to farming. Our
simulation was designed to address differences in outcomes only
for egalitarian and stratified societies with the same mode of
subsistence and inherent carrying capacities.
It could also be objected that poor families are generally larger
than well-off families. While this is true in societies that have
undergone the modern demographic transition, the modern cultural
and economic circumstances thought to drive this outcome do not
pertain to older, pre-demographic-shift societies such as those
investigated in our study.
Another potential objection might be that lower classes are
more likely to suffer deprivation and thus to migrate, leading to a
Figure 3. Representative migration competition outcomes in constant and variable environments. Solid lines show number of sites held
by stratified societies, and dotted lines show number of sites held by egalitarian societies. The two plots on the left (A, C) show rate of occupying sites
during the ‘‘frontier phase’’ when uninhabited sites are still available, while the two plots on the right (B, D) show what happens after all sites are
occupied (‘‘carrying capacity phase’’), and thus expansion can only take place when a site opens up because another population goes extinct. These
plots show results using the population decline trigger optimal values (loss of a threshold fraction of population), but results for the other two
migration triggers (resource deprivation threshold for individuals, and resource depletion threshold for sites) are similar. Stratified societies always
migrate outward more frequently, and thus take over quickly (A, C). Over the long term, in comparison with egalitarian societies they experience a
higher rate of group extinctions in constant environments (B), and a lower rate in variable environments (D).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024683.g003
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Petersen’s classic treatise on the various types of human migration
indicates that very few involve the relocation of families from only
one social class (c.f. p. 260) [40]. Other than the relatively rare
case of intentional emigration to establish a new type of society
(e.g. Kibbutzim), to our knowledge there are no data suggesting
that migrating groups alter their socioeconomic structure in the
process of migration.
The parameter values we used resulted in a population growth
rate (r) of approximately 0.01, before a resource limiting state is
reached. While some literature suggests that early human
populations could have had higher growth rates, approaching
r=0.03 [41], we ran trials with lower rates because hunter-
gatherer societies are known to have limited their reproduction,
and because our simulated populations went extinct with the
higher fertility rates. Sellen 2001 found that fertility goes up with
increasing dependence on agricultural subsistence [42]. Kirch and
Rallu 2007 estimated long-term average population growth for
Polynesian populations (horticulture and fishing) at ,1% [43].
Gurven and Kaplan 2007 estimated population growth rates for
hunter-gathers at 0–1%, for horticulturalists at .2%, and for
pastoralists at .2% [44].
Alternative Models of Inequality
There are various ways in which socioeconomic inequality can
be structured and maintained. Our results were qualitatively the
same for two classes as for five. When we initialized each of the five
classes with 20% of the population but did not maintain the class
structure over time, lower classes died off one by one, eventually
leaving only one class, which functioned as an egalitarian society
and rapidly stabilized its population. Our maintenance of class
structure each year—pulling population in from other classes as
needed—may be considered analogous to inheritance by primo-
geniture, in which first sons maintain the family fortune while later
sons slip into lower classes.
In order to determine whether our findings were robust to a
completely different model of inequality with no elements of class
structure, we modified our simulation to allocate resources to
individuals according to a Pareto Distribution [45]. We ran
baseline trials (constant environment, no storage of surplus, no
migration) using three different Pareto indices, chosen to generate
distributions covering the same range of Gini inequality
coefficients as our gradient analysis of class inequality. The results
indicate that Pareto-unequal populations have properties that are
nearly the same as those of the class societies used in our original
simulation: low, unstable population size, unresponsiveness to
carrying capacity, with more crashes and extinctions than those of
egalitarians (see Supporting Information S1). The one exception
occurred in populations with the most extreme Pareto index:
although highly unstable, these populations were so small that they
rarely exceeded carrying capacity or crashed. In short, inequality
in access to resources, whether based on class structure or Pareto
Distribution to individuals, results in similar demographic
instability.
To better understand the sources of demographic instability
generated by our simulation, we developed a simple recursive
equation for logistic population growth, with a variance in
carrying capacity, k. The results of iterating this equation are
shown in Supporting Information S1. As variance of the carrying
capacity increased, the trajectory of the population over time
became increasingly irregular, and eventually began to generate
population extinctions, just as we saw with increasing the resource
allocation multiplier for our simulated stratified societies.
Variance in k is intended as a substitute for the effects of
increased stratification (that is, increased variation in access to
resources by members of the population). While this sheds some
light on the increasingly unstable populations we see with
stratification, it is an oversimplification. There are at least four
sources of variance affecting resource availability in our full
simulation: natural variance in environmental productivity from
year to year (for variable environment trials), variance in resource
availability between years when the population is below carrying
capacity and years when the resource base becomes depleted,
variance between classes in the stratified societies, and variance
between egalitarians and the nine levels of stratified societies
(gradient multipliers 2 through 10). These variances interact to
give the unpredictable outcomes we see, especially those which
drive outward migration. Although some aspects of the population
instability in our simulation are captured by this equation, the
interesting story actually lies in the mathematically intractable
complexity.
Testing Predictions
These simulation trials are not intended to serve as a test of our
proposed hypothesis. Instead, the simulation is designed to clarify
and refine our hypotheses, ensuring internal consistency. The
ultimate test will come from comparing predictions generated by
the simulation to real-world data and to the ethnographic and
historical record.
If our model were valid, we would expect to see higher
migration rates from countries with greater inequality, all other
factors being equal. And indeed there is some evidence for this.
After controlling for a country’s wealth (GNP per capita) and
unemployment rate, Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004) found a strong
and significant relationship between income inequality (Gini
coefficient and other income disparity measures) and propensity
to emigrate out of 23 countries (survey of 28,000 individuals) [46].
Stark (2006) developed a model to explain these results, showing
that if total income is held constant, total relative deprivation, and
thus, according to his model, desire to emigrate, is positively
related to income inequality (Gini coefficient) [47].
Links between inequality and conflict have been sought for
modern societies, with mixed results [48–53]. In an ethnographic
study designed to understand determinants of conflict and peace in
small-scale prehistoric societies, a clear association was found
between level of stratification for 35 societies in Polynesia and level
of conflict within and between these societies [54]. Although
conflict was not used in our simulation, we have demonstrated an
underlying demographic force that can drive territorial expansion
and thus could promote conflict.
In our simulation, upper classes co-opt a disproportionate share
of resources, leaving lower classes to bear the brunt of any
mortality caused by resource shortages. Empirical studies suggest
that this may actually occur. Historical data on changes in
mortality as prices and production of food fluctuated from year to
year across Europe and in China showed that in response to a 4–
6% average consumption decline, the increase in mortality ranged
from less than 0% (i.e. mortality actually decreased) to over 15%,
depending on gender, age group, and socioeconomic class [32].
Several studies have documented health disparities in prehistoric
skeletal remains [55]. Osteological data from a number of early
foraging and agricultural societies show that within-group height
and nutrition disparities developed along with socioeconomic
inequalities [26]. A positive association between lower socioeco-
nomic status and higher mortality has been well-documented in
contemporary populations [56–65].
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stratified societies constitute a rich source of relevant observations.
As a test of the explanatory powers of our model, we summarized
15 such studies without regard to their implications for our
predictions [15,43,54,66–79]. We noted whether the following
indicators, predicted by our model, were observed in conjunction
with the rise of stratified societies: unequal allocation of resources,
population instability, migration, conflict, storage of surplus,
variable environments, and increased frequency of stratified
societies through their spread rather than through internal
development.
The results of this analysis (see Supporting Information S1)
provide modest support for our model. Only two studies reported
contradictory findings (the Levant and the Intermontane Plateau).
Because both our analysis and the case studies themselves are
based on qualitative assessments, there is no legitimate way to
assign statistical probabilities to our findings.
In short, our hypothesis fits available data relatively well, and
should be tested with additional empirical data, both contempo-
rary and ethnographic. This is not simply an academic exercise.
Socioeconomic inequality may promote conflict within and
between ethnic groups, classes and societies, and drive interna-
tional immigration, as mentioned above. It appears to raise
prevalence of poor health, mental illness, crime, violence, and
other societal ills [56,80,81]. Inequality reduces cultural diversity
through disempowerment of local minority communities [82]. It
may harm working relationships within businesses [83], inhibit
economic growth in developing countries [84], reduce sustain-
ability [85–88], promote corruption [89], and play a role in
destabilizing economies [90]. Perhaps most dangerously, inequal-
ity erodes trust and blocks cooperative solutions to urgent social,
economic and political problems [87,91–93]. Understanding the
causes and consequences of inequality is clearly one of the central
challenges of the social sciences. Our further research on this
critical topic will attempt to identify behavioral traits that tend to
increase in frequency in unequal societies, as well as leverage
points for shifting societies towards greater stability and social
sustainability.
Methods
We constructed an agent-based demographic simulation in
which isolated human populations depend on the resources
produced at each occupied site (see Supporting Information S1
for details). Each of 100 sites had just one type of society: either
egalitarian or stratified. We assumed a Malthusian, pre-demo-
graphic-transition scenario where population growth eventually
resulted in resource depletion, with no behavioral or cultural
limitations on births. In order to understand the underlying
dynamics of the population-resource interaction, we did not use a
logistic or density-dependent growth function, but allowed
populations to overshoot carrying capacity. We tracked all
individuals by gender, age, and class. The simulation was
stochastic, except for the resource productivity function, which
was deterministic. All sites were assumed to be the same size and
equidistant from one another; this spatial element played no overt
role other than the separation of sites. Each time step in the
simulation corresponded to one year.
Inequality was not defined individually in our baseline
simulation. Each population was designated as egalitarian (no
classes) or stratified (population divided into 5 classes, each
maintained at 1/5 of the population by being redistributed yearly).
Resources were then allocated to individuals based on class
structure and resource availability. The factor by which resource
allocation to the uppermost class exceeded that to the lowest class
ranged from 2 to 10, approximating Gini inequality coefficients
ranging from 0.14 to 0.42.
Because there are many ways in which a class society may be
structured, we also ran the simulation using two very different
models: one in which there were only two classes (again with
allocation to the upper class exceeding that of the lower class by a
factor ranging from 2 to 10), and one in which each individual
received a different allocation, according to a Pareto Distribution
(with the same range of Gini inequality coefficients, from 0.14 to
0.42). We assume that any intermediate resource allocation
scheme would give results falling somewhere between the results
of these three models.
A total of 40 resource units per year met the needs of one
individual. As resources became limited, upper classes took their
allocation before lower classes. In egalitarian societies, if more
resources were available at that site, they were left untouched,
while if fewer resources were available, everyone shared equally in
the deprivation. No human labor productivity was included in the
simulation, and mode of subsistence (foraging, pastoral, or
agricultural) was not specified.
We assumed a default productivity rate (R) of 20,000 additional
resource units produced per site per year. However, if the
resources at the site had been depleted by the population, R was
lower, as follows:
R~1=3|(resources left from past year)z
2=3|(ideal productivity of site)
where R was capped at 20,000. This resource renewal increment
was added to the previous year’s resources to determine the total
resources available in the present year. Each site was initialized at
triple its annual productivity, i.e. at 60,000 resource units, and
total resources were not allowed to exceed this amount.
Mortality and fertility rates were functions of age, class, and
allocated resources, designed to approximate observed empirical
relationships between survival and food availability. The param-
eter values we used resulted in an annual population growth rate
(r), before resources became limiting, of approximately 0.01. For
females in the age group 18–36, the probability of giving birth to a
child in any given year was the product of a fitness metric and a
resource reproduction factor, calculated using a maximum fertility
rate and an elasticity function linking fertility to actual resource
allocation, as follows:
if res§40
Pb~F|Mb
if resƒLb
Pb~0
if 40wreswLb
Pb~F|Mb|
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
(1{x2)
p
where res=resources allocated to that individual in that year
Pb=probability of that individual giving birth in that year
F=class fitness metric
Highest class: 1.005
Second class: 1.003
Third class: 1.000
Fourth class: 0.997
Lowest class: 0.995
The Spread of Inequality
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Lb=low end resource allocation at which births are no longer
possible
x~ 40{res ðÞ = 40{Lb ðÞ
Births alternated between male and female.
From age 0–65, the probability of survival was the product of
the fitness metric mentioned above, and a resource survival factor
(calculated using a maximum survival rate and an elasticity
function linking survival to actual resource allocation). From age
65 to 72, the probability of survival was the product of the fitness
metric, the resource survival factor, and an aging factor (which
diminished linearly from 1 to 0 from age 65 to age 72), as follows:
if res§40
Ps~F|A|Ms
if resƒLs
Ps~0
if 40wreswLs
Ps~F|A|Ms|
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
(1{x2)
p
where res=resources allocated to that individual in that year
Ps=probability of that individual surviving that year
F=class fitness metric (as above)
A=age survival factor (declines linearly from 1 to 0 between age
65 to age 72)
Ms=maximum probability of surviving in any given year
Ls=low end resource allocation at which survival is no longer
possible
x~ 40{res ðÞ = 40{Ls ðÞ
No individual survived above the age of 72.
A set of baseline parameters and initial conditions was
developed that gave results encompassing a realistic range of
outcomes—from general population stability through periodic
extinctions. Any parameter values or initial conditions that caused
most simulated populations to go rapidly extinct were rejected as
not useful for understanding the system dynamics. Using these
baseline parameters and initial conditions, each simulation was
run for 100 populations for each of the 10 inequality gradient
levels (from egalitarian through a 10-fold gradient). These 2000-
year trials assumed a constant baseline productivity rate from year
to year, and did not allow storage of surplus resources or migration
to new sites.
Data for each of the ten inequality gradient levels were analyzed
to see if there were significant differences in percent time spent in a
state of population stability, number of demographic crises,
probability of extinction, responsiveness to carrying capacity,
and extent of resource depletion (see Supporting Information S1
for definitions and statistical tests). We conducted a visual
inspection of our data to assess whether upper classes continued
to grow when resources were scarce and the overall population
was losing numbers, and whether lower classes experienced
relatively high mortality even when resources were relatively
abundant and overall population growth continued. In both cases,
the answer was yes.
We next conducted a detailed sensitivity analysis of the model.
We varied the value of each of the key parameters incrementally
up and down from the baseline values, running the simulation to
see if altered parameter values would result in similar outputs with
respect to relative population size, population stability, and rate of
population extinctions for the different levels of inequality. See
Supporting Information S1 for details of these tests.
We modified our simulation to allocate resources individual by
individual according to a Pareto or Power Law Distribution,
rather than by class. Three Pareto Index values were used, giving
distributions with Gini coefficients of 0.14, 0.28, and 0.423. Each
of these three distributions was generated randomly using the
MatLab ‘‘gprnd’’ command [94]. As with the simulated class
societies, actual allocation started with the wealthiest individual
and moved down the list until resources ran out. Unlucky
individuals at the bottom died of resource deprivation.
In order to compare the simulated dynamics of population
instability in stratified populations to a simple analytical model, we
constructed a simple recursive equation for logistic population
growth, with a variance in carrying capacity—i.e. size of
population that can be supported by available resources:
xtz1~xtzrxt(1{
xt
k
)
where x=population, t=time, r=population growth rate, and
k=carrying capacity with a variance of j. The recursion was
parameterized at six different levels of variance on k (equivalent to
standard deviations from 16.6–33.3% of k), and iterated over 5000
time steps.
After using the above techniques to understand the basic
simulation properties and outcomes, we altered the model to
investigate the results of incorporating additional properties. We
compared the following four situations for all 10 gradient levels:
constant environment without storage (the baseline trials), constant
environment with storage, variable environment without storage,
and variable environment with storage. Storage consisted of saving
some specified portion of ‘‘excess’’ resources (over the optimal 40
units) allocated to an individual in a given year, to be used later
when less than the optimal amount of resources was available.
Variable environments were modeled by allowing three types of
years – good years (ideal productivity rate according to the
baseline model above), bad years (ideal productivity at 2/3rd the
rate of good years) and very bad years (productivity at 1/3rd the
rate of good years). We modeled this using a 3-state Markov model
where each state corresponded to one of the three year types.
Transition coefficients specified the probabilities of each state for
the next year, based on the state in the current year.
We then ran trials in which populations could migrate as
needed. The 100 sites were initialized with only 10 populations (5
egalitarian, and 5 stratified with inequality gradient 8), leaving 90
sites empty at the beginning. Populations were allowed to grow just
as in the baseline trials, but also to migrate according to one of the
following three migration triggers: declining population (specified
threshold percent decline in total population numbers over 2 years
at 8%, 13%, and 18%); resource deprivation (specified threshold
amount of resources allocated per person for all egalitarians, and
for individuals of the 4th class in stratified societies, at 36, 34, and
32); or resource depletion (specified threshold amount of resources
remaining at a site at 45000, 30000, and 15000 total resource
units).
In each case, when the threshold was reached, a total of 65
people (or half the remaining population for populations under
130) would attempt to migrate. If unoccupied sites were still
The Spread of Inequality
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destination. When there were no unoccupied sites, migrating
groups were assumed to die. Because populations went extinct
from time to time, sites would periodically become available again
for occupation by another group. For each trial we tracked how
long it took for all 100 sites to fill, the number of migration events
for each society type, the percent of populations going extinct for
each society type, and the final fraction of sites held by egalitarian
and stratified societies (see Supporting Information S1 for detailed
results). After learning which threshold values for each type of
migration trigger led to the highest fraction of sites occupied by
egalitarian groups and by stratified groups, we ran new
competition trials using this optimal trigger value for each type
of society, tracking the same metrics as before.
Supporting Information
Supporting Information S1 Methods and Results. Meth-
odological details not provided in the text of the main article are
found here, including explanations of the statistical tests used and
the sensitivity analysis of the simulation, and the analysis of
archaeological case studies. Extensive results for most parts of the
study are also provided, using figures and tables for which there
was not room in the main article.
(PDF)
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